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THE LESSONS OF MILLER AND
HUDNUT. ON PROPOSING A
PORNOGRAPHY ORDINANCE THAT
PASSES CONSTITUTIONAL
MUSTER
Martin Karo* and Marcia McBrian**
"[It is] the right of the Nation and of the States to maintain
a decent society .... I
Efforts to restrict or ban pornography have recently assumed
increased prominence for several reasons. First, much more por-
nographic material is available now than ever before,2 and an
increasingly large proportion is violent, degrading, and explicit.3
Second, and most important, is the growing realization that por-
nography is not "harmless dirty pictures." Researchers have
compiled a massive body of evidence that indicates pornography
directly and indirectly causes serious harm to women." Third,
* Associate, Laxalt, Washington, Perito & Dubuc, Washington, D.C.. Contributing
Editor, 20 U. Mich. J.L. Ref. (1987); A.B., Princeton University, 1984; J.D., University of
Michigan Law School, 1987.
** B.A., University of Notre Dame (1981); J.D., University of Michigan Law School,
1987.
1. Jacobellis v. Ohio, 378 U.S. 184, 199 (1964) (Warren, C.J., dissenting).
2. See U.S. DEP'T OF JUST., 1 ATTORNEY GENERAL'S COMM'N ON PORNOGRAPHY, FINAL
REPORT 280, 284 (1986) [hereinafter REPORT].
3. Id. at 323-24.
4. See REPORT, supra note 2, at 322-47; see also Donnerstein, Aggressive Erotica and
Violence Against Women, 39 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOLOGY 269, 274-75 (1980)
(finding that for male experimental subjects, aggressive erotic film caused an increase in
aggressive behavior over nonviolent erotica and nonviolent, nonsexual control films; ag-
gression was measured via electric shocks administered to other people; violent pornogra-
phy caused increased aggression overall, and produced the highest increase in aggression
toward females); Malamuth, Factors Associated With Rape as Predictors of Laboratory
Aggression Against Women, 45 J. PERSONALITY & Soc. PSYCHOLOGY 432, 432-33 (1983)
(citing Burt, Cultural Myths and Supports for Rape, 38 J. Personality & Soc. Psychol-
ogy 217, (1980)) (finding that acceptance of rape myths, such as those embodied in com-
mon pornographic rape depictions, correlated positively with acceptance of violence to-
ward women); Malamuth, Heim & Feshbach, Sexual Responsiveness of College Students
to Rape Depictions: Inhibitory and Disinhibitory Effects, 38 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSY-
CHOLOGY 399, 405 (1980) (finding that erotic depictions of rape in which the victim is
portrayed as experiencing an orgasm aroused viewers as much as depictions of mutually
consenting sex, and finding that male subjects were more aroused when the victim exper-
ienced an orgasm and pain than when the victim experienced an orgasm and no pain);
Nelson, Pornography and Sexual Aggression, in THE INFLUENCE OF PORNOGRAPHY ON BE-
HAVIOUR 171 (1982). See generally Donnerstein & Berkowitz, Victim Reactions in Ag-
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the movement of feminism into the American political main-
stream has caused many politicians to become more sensitive to
feminist concerns. Fourth, pornography distribution has become
a key profit item for organized crime.5 Fifth, harm to children, a
traditionally recognized evil of pornography, is an even greater
gressive Erotic Films as a Factor in Violence Against Women, 41 J. PERSONALITY & Soc.
PSYCHOLOGY 710 (1981); Donnerstein & Hallam, 36 Facilitating Effects of Erotica on
Aggression Against Women, J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOLOGY 1270 (1978); Malamuth
& Donnerstein, The Effects of Aggressive-Pornographic Mass Media Stimuli, 15 AD-
VANCES IN EXPERIMENTAL SOC. PSYCHOLOGY 103 (1982); Russell, Pornography and Vio-
lence: What Does the New Research Say?, in TAKE BACK THE NIGHT 218 (L. Lederer ed.
1980); Sapolsky & Zillmann, The Effect of Soft-Core and Hard-Core Erotica on Pro-
voked and Unprovoked Hostile Behavior, 17 J. SEX RES. 319 (1981); Zillmann, Hoyt &
Day, Strength and Duration of the Effect of Aggressive, Violent and Erotic Communi-
cations on Subsequent Aggressive Behavior, 1 COMM. REs. 286 (1974).
Although some observers theorize that only violent pornography causes harm, recent
research does not support this view. See Baron & Straus, Sexual Stratification, Pornog-
raphy, and Rape in the United States, in PORNOGRAPHY AND SEXUAL AGGRESSION 185,
195-98 (1984) (establishing positive correlation between the circulation of popular men's
sex magazines and the rate of reported rape); Donnerstein & Barrett, Effects of Erotic
Stimuli on Male Aggression Toward Females, 36 J. PERSONALITY & Soc. PSYCHOLOGY
180, 185 (1978) (finding that nonviolent erotic films increased subsequent aggression
overall); Malamuth & Check, Penile Tumescence and Perceptual Responses to Rape as
a Function of Victim's Perceived Reactions, 10 J. APPLIED SOC. PSYCHOLOGY 528, 537
(1980) (finding that male experimental subjects previously exposed to nonviolent, mutu-
ally consenting intercourse pornography were as aroused by a subsequent rape depiction
as males previously exposed to a rape portrayal in which the victim was perceived as
being aroused by the assault; both groups much more aroused than males previously
exposed to violent pornography in which the victim continually abhors the assault);
Zillmann & Bryant, Pornography, Sexual Callousness, and the Trivialization of Rape,
32(4) J. OF COMM. at 10, 19 (1982) (finding that high exposure to nonviolent pornography
resulted in a loss of compassion toward women as rape victims and toward women in
general).
To capsulize the findings of the research: exposure to pornography, both nonviolent
and more strikingly violent, increases anger, arousal, and aggressive behavior toward
women, and induces trivialization of rape and assaults against women. Scientific experi-
ments using pornography to trigger actual violence and/or sexual assaults against women
would be unethical, but anecdotal evidence indicates that pornography is often involved
in actual incidents of violence against women, including the use of materials like "how-
to" manuals in rapes and assaults. See Ordinance to Add Pornography as Discrimina-
tion Against Women: Hearings Before the Government Operations Committee, Minne-
apolis City Council, 2d Sess. at 23-29, 63-79 (Dec. 12-13, 1983); MacKinnon, Pornogra-
phy, Civil Rights, and Speech, 20 HARv.C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 1, 46-50 (1985). Regarding the
link between pornography-inspired arousal and behavior, see Griffin, Sadism and Ca-
tharsis: The Treatment Is the Disease, in TAKE BACK THE NIGHT 141 (L. Lederer ed.
1980). Moreover, Malamuth found a close relationship between laboratory aggression
and real-world aggression. Malamuth, supra, at 440-41 (finding a valid relationship be-
tween factors associated with real-world aggression against women and laboratory ag-
gression). For a discussion of the early studies and their limitations, see Donnerstein,
Pornography and Violence Against Women: Experimental Studies, 347 ANNALS OF THE
N. Y. ACAD. OF SC. 277 (1980).
5. REPORT, supra note 2, at 1039-53.
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concern in the wake of growing public recognition of child sexual
abuse.'
Recognizing these factors, various political bodies have re-
cently taken action. A Presidential Commission on pornography
published its findings and recommendations.7 The Supreme
Court upheld a strong New York law outlawing child pornogra-
phy.' The city of Indianapolis passed a civil rights-based anti-
pornography ordinance9 drafted by feminists Catharine MacK-
innon and Andrea Dworkin, but the ordinance was later
declared unconstitutional. 0
American cities and states need new antipornography laws
that forbid depictions that cause harm and do not have serious
countervailing social value. First, as discussed below, present
laws are ineffective; they were originally intended to enforce out-
moded notions of "propriety," not to prevent harm to women.
As society changed, the impetus to enforce laws based on propri-
ety notions progressively eroded. Second, existing law enforce-
ment is inadequate;1' many judicial officers simply do not view
obscenity violations as serious crimes. 12 Legislatures must cor-
rect this impression, sending prosecutors, law enforcement of-
ficers, and judicial officials a clear signal by enacting new and
comprehensive antipornography ordinances. Third, a law al-
lowing limited private rights of action would create a powerful
impetus to alter behavior that harms society by assessing the
6. REPORT, supra note 2, at 405-10.
7. REPORT, supra note 2.
8. New York v. Ferber, 458 U.S. 747 (1982).
9. INDIANAPOLIS, IND., CODE § 16-1 (1984). An identical ordinance was passed by the
Minneapolis City Council, MINNEAPOLIS, MINN., CODE OF ORDINANCES, tit. 7, ch. 139
(1982), but was eventually vetoed by the Mayor.
Civil rights-based antipornography ordinances treat pornography as a violation of the
civil rights of women with the purpose of invoking against pornography strong laws de-
veloped to combat racism. The ordinances generally provide for ease of enforcement
against pornographic material distibutors and grant individual women causes of action
against those distributors.
10. American Booksellers Ass'n v. Hudnut, 771 F.2d 323 (7th Cir. 1985), a/I'd, 475
U.S. 1001 (1986).
11. REPORT, supra note 2, at 366-72; see also Press, The War Against Pornography,
NEWSWEEK, Mar. 18, 1985 at 58, 65.
While a few prosecutors in Atlanta and Houston have been notably successful in
attacking porn parlors, most have retreated from the field. County prosecutor
Deborah Daniels in Indianapolis says that it's difficult to convince a jury in most
obscenity cases, "so the attitude in a lot of places is why bother?" In New York,
police Capt. Jerome Piazza says, "The community doesn't complain and the
judges tell us not to waste their time." The same rules apply on the federal level.
Id. at 65.
12. REPORT, supra note 2, at 368.
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costs of the harm against the pornographer in the form of
damages.
This Note first reviews the evolution of obscenity law, concen-
trating on the modern obscenity test formulated in Miller v.
California,1 3 including its requirement that any obscenity prose-
cution must be based on a state statute, not merely on the com-
mon law. It then examines the elements of the Miller test, argu-
ing that legislatures may determine statewide "community
standards" of patently offensive depictions of sexual conduct
and discusses the permissibility of legislative expansion of por-
nography regulation beyond the present boundaries. Part II ex-
amines the federal courts' analysis of the civil rights-based anti-
pornography ordinance passed in Indianapolis. Part III suggests
standards for antiobscenity laws. Part IV proposes a model ordi-
nance, which should be held constitutional under existing law,
designed to attack the most harmful pornographic material.
I. CONTEMPORARY OBSCENITY LAW
Existing obscenity laws are the product of many years of
evolution. The rationale for these laws has changed over time;
antiobscenity laws enacted specifically to avert harm to women
are a very recent phenomenon. Because new obscenity laws must
fit within the established constraints of the first amendment, an
examination of the history of obscenity law is necessary to illu-
minate the purposes and limits of the first amendment.
A. A Short History of Obscenity Law
Restricting obscenity is not new. As long ago as 1727, English
courts convicted publishers of offensive material of corrupting
the public morals, a common law crime."' American pornography
law originated with a 1711 Massachusetts colonial statute."5
13. 413 U.S. 15 (1973). Miller still remains the relevant test. See, e.g., Pope v. Illinois,
482 U.S. 497, 500 (1987).
14. Dominus Rex v. Curl, 93 Eng. Rep. 849 (K.B. 1727).
15. The law prohibited "composing, writing, printing, or publishing of any filthy, ob-
scene or profane story, pamphlets, libel or mock sermon." ANCIENT CHARTER, COLONY
LAWS AND PROVINCE LAWS OF MASSACHUSErrS BAY (1814), quoted in Alshuler, Origins of
the Law of Obscenity, in 2 TECHNICAL REPORT OF THE COMM'N ON OBSCENITY AND POR-
NOGRAPHY 65, 75 (1971). Early American prosecutions for publication of obscenity were
based on the common law or antiobscenity statutes. Commonwealth v. Sharpless, 2 Serg.
& Rawle 91 (Pa. 1815); Commonwealth v. Holmes, 17 Mass. 335 (1821); see also LAWS OF
[VOL. 23:1
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Congress passed a strong antiobscenity law, popularly known as
the Comstock Act, in 1873.16 At first, American courts applied
the English Hicklin test 17 in Comstock Act cases despite wide-
spread disagreement over what constituted obscenity under that
test."1
In the early twentieth century, the Hicklin test lost vitality.
Judge Learned Hand criticized it in 1913 and enunciated the
modern "community standards" test eventually adopted by the
Supreme Court. 19 Subsequent cases thoroughly rejected Hick-
lin.20 The demise of Hicklin did not mean that the courts used
the first amendment to protect obscenity in the early twentieth
century. Quite the contrary; although the courts often disagreed
regarding what was considered obscene,21 judges did not see the
first amendment as a significant barrier to obscenity prosecu-
tions. In Roth v. United States,22 however, the Supreme Court
held that simply designating a prosecution as an obscenity case
did not automatically remove the case from the purview of the
first amendment.23
Roth indicated that genuinely obscene materials remained
outside the protection of the first amendment.24 The Roth Court
defined obscenity as sexual material "utterly without redeeming
social importance."2 5 The Court assumed a dichotomy between
material that presented ideas, no matter how controversial or
VERMONT, 1824, Ch. XXIII, no.1, § 23 (1821); 5 U.S. Stat. 556, § 28 (1842). Enforcement
of these statutes was generally lax, leading several citizens and religious groups, most
notably under the leadership of Anthony Comstock, to take action. Alshuler supra at 77.
16. 18 U.S.C. § 1461 (1982).
17. See generally The Queen v. Hicklin, 3 L.R.-Q.B. 360 (1868). The Hicklin test of
obscenity was whether the offending passages, taken alone, had a tendency to "deprave
and corrupt those whose minds are open to such immoral influences, and into whose
hands a publication of this sort may fall." Id. at 371.
18: L. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 658 (1978).
19. See United States v. Kennerly, 209 F. 119, 121 (S.D.N.Y. 1913). This test was
adopted by the Supreme Court in Miller v. California, 413 U.S. 15, 24 (1973).
20. See United States v. One Book Entitled Ulysses, 72 F.2d 705, 708 (2d Cir. 1934);
Commonwealth v. Gordon, 66 Pa. D. & C. 101 (Phila. 1949).
21. State courts have declared various works obscene: Attorney General v. Book
Named "God's Little Acre," 326 Mass. 281, 93 N.E.2d 819 (1950) (Erskine Caldwell's
God's Little Acre held obscene); Commonwealth v. Friede, 271 Mass. 318, 171 N.E. 472
(1930) (Theodore Dreiser's An American Tragedy held obscene); People v. Dial Press,
182 Misc. 416, 48 N.Y.S.2d 480 (Mag. Ct. 1929) (D.H. Lawrence's Lady Chatterly's Lover
held obscene); People v. Friede, 133 Misc. 611, 233 N.Y.S. 565 (Mag. Ct. 1929); and Peo-
ple v. Seltzer, 122 Misc. 329, 203 N.Y.S. 809 (Sup. Ct. 1924) (courts held that Radclyffe
Hall's The Well of Loneliness was obscene).
22. 354 U.S. 476 (1957).
23. Id. at 484.
24. Id. at 485.
25. Id. at 484. The Supreme Court's definition of obscenity differs from the common
usage denoting offensive or obnoxious language. Cf. F.C.C. v. Pacifica Found., 438 U.S.
Journal of Law Reform
hateful, and material intended purely to titillate or excite.2 6 The
Court found the Roth language entirely unsatisfactory in prac-
tice, however, and replaced Roth's obscenity definition sixteen
years later in Miller v. California.27
Chief Justice Burger, writing for the Court in Miller, enunci-
ated the modern obscenity test:
[W]e now confine the permissible scope of such regula-
tion to works which depict or describe sexual con-
duct. . . . A state offense must also be limited to works
which, taken as a whole, appeal to the prurient interest
in sex, which portray sexual conduct in a patently offen-
sive way, and which, taken as a whole, do not have seri-
ous literary, artistic, political, or scientific value.
The basic guidelines for the trier of fact must be: (a)
whether "the average person, applying contemporary
community standards" would find that the work, taken
as a whole, appeals to the prurient interest . . . (b)
whether the work depicts or describes, in a patently of-
fensive way, sexual conduct specifically defined by the
applicable state law; and (c) whether the work, taken as a
whole, lacks serious literary, artistic, political, or scien-
tific value.2"
The Miller test represents a significant compromise struck to
enunciate a clear, workable obscenity standard: a nationwide
standard applies to the search for serious literary, artistic, politi-
726, 738 (1978) (holding that obnoxious, vulgar language is not obscene, but the govern-
ment could restrict its broadcast); see also infra note 134.
26. 354 U.S. at 484.
27. 413 U.S. 15, 24-25 (1973).
28. Id. at 24. For its definition of "prurient interest," the Court referred to Roth v.
United States, 354 U.S. at 487 n.20: "material having a tendency to excite lustful
thoughts[,] . . . a shameful or morbid interest in nudity, sex, or excretion, and if it goes
substantially beyond customary limits of candor in description or representation of such
matters." 413 U.S. at 24. In dicta, the Court limited the scope of obscenity prohibitions
to " 'hard-core' sexual conduct." Id. at 27. For discussion of the significance of the re-
striction, see infra notes 151-56 and accompanying text. The Miller opinion listed several
examples of obscene material, 413 U.S. at 25, but the list was not intended to be exhaus-
tive. See, e.g., Ward v. Illinois, 431 U.S. 767, 773 (1977); Hamling v. United States, 418
U.S. 87, 114 (1974).
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cal, or scientific value;"e but a community standard applies to a
work's appeal to prurient interest and patent offensiveness."0
B. The Meaning of "Community Standards"
Miller clarifies that the jury should apply community stan-
dards to determine the permissibility of material before it. But
this phrase, which dates to Roth,"1 is not self-defining, and
courts encountered considerable trouble interpreting it.3 2 Even
Miller leaves some doubt as to what practices the phrase
allows. 33
1. The permissibility of legislative determination- Miller
did not say, for example, where the jury is to find community
standards. Although it would be rational to leave determinations
of community standards wholly to the jury 4 on the grounds that
it is a proxy for its community, Miller does not specifically sanc-
tion this practice. Indeed, Jenkins v. Georgia 5 held that juries
could not rely solely upon their own idea of what the community
should permit. By limiting jury discretion in determining pruri-
ence and patent offensiveness,3 6 the Court forced the jury to rely
on broader sources of community standards.
29. See Smith v. United States, 431 U.S. 291, 301 (1977); see also Pope v. Illinois, 481
U.S. 497, 500-01 (1987) (holding that juries may not apply local standards in deciding
social value, but may apply local standards regarding patent offensiveness and appeal to
prurient interest under the Miller test).
30. Smith, 431 U.S. at 301. Juries do not have unbridled discretion regarding deter-
mination of appeal to prurient interest and patent offensiveness; determinations are sub-
ject to constitutional review. Jenkins v. Georgia, 418 U.S. 153, 160 (1974). The Court
wanted the widest possible dissemination of valuable ideas and did not want small-
minded local officials stifling their free flow. At the same time, the Court noted, national
standards for prurient interest and patent offensiveness were unworkable. Miller, 413
U.S. at 32-33.
31. 354 U.S. 476, 489 (1957).
32. See Shugrue, An Atlas for Obscenity: Exploring Community Standards, 7
CREIGHTON L. REV. 157, 158 (1974). For an argument against the use of community stan-
dards in obscenity law, see Schauer, Reflections on "Contemporary Community Stan-
dards": The Perpetuation of an Irrelevant Concept in the Law of Obscenity, 56 N.C.L.
REV. 1 (1978).
33. Shugrue, supra note 32, at 159.
34. See Note, Community Standards, Class Actions, and Obscenity Under Miller v.
California, 88 HARV. L. REV. 1838, 1843 n.39 (1975). ("The most common approach has
been to leave identification of the relevant community and its standards to the trier of
fact.")
35. 418 U.S. 153 (1974).
36. Id. at 161. Schauer relies upon the same principle to support legislative determi-
nation of standards: "[P]atent offensiveness implies community rejection. But commu-
nity acceptance or rejection seems to be a peculiarly legislative matter. Schauer,
supra note 32, at 18.
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The source used to determine community standards should be
statutory. Expert testimony on obscenity, presumably including
the prevailing community standards, is not favored by the Su-
preme Court. 7 More important, to prosecute for obscenity at all,
the state must rely on a statute; the more specific that statute,
the less discretion the factfinder has.38 Miller itself requires spe-
cific statutes that delineate forbidden conduct.3 9
Statutory, rather than jury, determinations have practical ad-
vantages for both sides in the pornography debate. Those favor-
ing pornography restrictions may prefer to lobby legislators be-
cause, unlike jury determination at trial, they have a full and
fair opportunity to influence the outcome. Moreover, the legisla-
ture may accord more weight to their interests and injuries,
which are real but difficult to value in dollars.
Distributors of pornography may prefer legislative determina-
tions as well. Major magazine and video tape distributors gener-
ally sink enormous investments into their systems. An unfortu-
nate decision by an unusually sheltered small-town jury could be
accompanied by a large damage award or criminal penalty.
37. See Paris Adult Theatre I v. Slaton, 413 U.S. 49, 56 n.6 (1973); see also Brigman,
The Controversial Role of the Expert in Obscenity Litigation, 7 CAP. UL. REV. 519
(1978). For an earlier treatment, see Note, The Use of Expert Testimony in Obscenity
Litigation, 1965 Wis. L. REV. 113. But see Bell, Determining Community Standards, 63
A.B.A. J. 1202 (1977).
38. Limits exist regarding how far the state can restrict the jury in federal obscenity
prosecutions. In Smith v. United States, 431 U.S. 291 (1976), the Supreme Court held
that a state legislature could not eliminate jury discretion in deciding the dimensions of
"patently offensive" and intent to appeal to prurient interest. Id. In other words, the
state legislature must allow the jury room for its own discretion in a federal obscenity
trial; only local community standards as understood and applied by jurors will be used in
prosecutions. Different standards may apply in different courts. Although local commu-
nity standards must apply in federal obscenity prosecutions, a statewide community
standard for state prosecutions may be permissible. See Myers, "Contemporary Commu-
nity Standards" in Obscenity Prosecutions-Smith v. United States, 30 BAYLOR L. REV.
317, 325-26 (1978); Waples & White, Choice of Community Standards in Federal Ob-
scenity Proceedings: The Role of the Constitution and the Common Law, 64 VA. L. REV.
399, 405-09 (1978). The state retains a considerable role in formulating community stan-
dards. For example, the state can define proscribed conduct:
This is not to say that state legislatures are completely foreclosed from enact-
ing laws setting substantive limitations for obscenity cases. On the contrary, we
have indicated on several occasions that legislation of this kind is permissible.
State legislation must still define the kinds of conduct that will be regulated by
the State.
Smith, 431 U.S. at 302 (citation omitted); see also Myers, supra at 326. Myers argues
that the subjective standard the Supreme Court approved in Smith inadequately pro-
tects individual rights. Id. at 326-29. Other Supreme Court decisions demonstrate that
juries need considerable guidance with respect to patent offensiveness according to com-
munity standards. See, e.g., Jenkins v. Georgia, 418 U.S. 153, 161 (1974).
39. 413 U.S. at 15, 25 (1972).
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Franchisees, fearing similar penalties, might react by ceasing to
carry all potentially controversial material.'0 The end result
could be the loss of an entire distribution network and enormous
sums of money. Moreover, although any given trial usually has
only one defendant, all pornographers have an interest in the
outcome of a case. Distributors and franchisees can influence the
legislature, and the legislative determination can be relied upon.
In the same vein, civil libertarians are not limited to filing amici
briefs; the statute drafting process, with its prominent public
hearings, assures that those favoring the privilege to print al-
most anything can reach an influential, educated, and worldly
audience.
2. State standards are appropriate- What size community
should be used in formulating the statutory standard? As the
Supreme Court noted, standards of what is erotic or patently
offensive vary from state to state and within states. In the
Court's opinion, national standards of prurience or patent offen-
siveness are clearly incompatible with national diversity. 1 Be-
tween the extremes of nation and jury, courts have upheld a
wide variety of geographic definitions of community.' State
courts have approved units ranging from state 3 to county" to
city"'5 to local community. 6 Federal courts have held community
to mean state,'47 county,' 8 and federal judicial district.' As to
40. For example, Southland Corporation recently pulled Playboy, Penthouse, and
Forum magazines from the shelves of all "7-11" franchise convenience stores in response
to protests by Jerry Falwell's organization.
41. Miller, 413 U.S. at 30.
42. Waples & White, supra note 38 at 402-03.
43. People v. Calbud, Inc., 49 N.Y.2d 389, 426 N.Y.S.2d 238, 402 N.E.2d 1140 (1980);
LaRue v. State, 611 S.W.2d 63 (Tex. Crim. App. 1980); Commonwealth v. 707 Main
Corp., 371 Mass. 374, 357 N.E.2d 753 (1976); People v. Better, 33 Ill. App. 3d 58, 337
N.E.2d 272 (1975); Pierce v. State, 292 Ala. 473, 296 So.2d 218 (1974), cert. denied, 419
U.S. 1130 (1975). Statewide standards have been supported based on the value of (rela-
tive) uniformity, Pierce, 296 So.2d at 224-26; Court v. State, 63 Wis. 2d 570, 576-77, 217
N.W.2d 676, 679 (1974) (per curiam). Statewide standards have been criticized as artifi-
cial, see Court, 63 Wis. 2d at 582-83, 217 N.W.2d at 682 (Hansen, J., concurring). But see
Pierce, supra 292 Ala. at 480-82, 296 So. 2d at 226.
44. Sedelbauer v. Indiana, 428 N.E.2d 206 (Ind. 1981), cert. denied, 455 U.S. 1035
(1982); State v. DePiano, 150 N.J. Super. 309, 375 A.2d 1169 (1977).
45. People v. Ridens, 59 Ill. 2d 362, 321 N.E.2d 264 (1974), cert. denied, 421 U.S. 993
(1975); City of Belleville v. Morgan, 60 Il. App. 3d 434, 376 N.E.2d 704 (1974).
46. Price v. Commonwealth, 214 Va. 490, 201 S.E.2d 798, cert. denied, 419 U.S. 902
(1974).
47. United States v. Danley, 523 F.2d 369, 370 (9th. Cir. 1975).
48. United States v. Bagnell, 679 F.2d 826, 836 (11th Cir. 1982), cert. denied, 460
U.S. 1047 (1983).
49. United States v. Dachsteiner, 518 F.2d 20, 21-22 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 421 U.S.
954 (1975).
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where the relevant community is located, federal courts have
split, opting for both the trial and material-distribution
locations."
Analysis of the Miller opinion suggests the Court envisioned a
statewide standard.5 As Judge Harold Leventhal noted, "[m]ost
of the references in Miller are to 'state' offenses, and there is a
ring of federalism that focuses on states' rights. '53 Certainly the
Court will accept a statewide standard;54 it upheld California's
standard in Miller. In doing so, the Court contrasted the tastes
of the people of Maine and Mississippi to those of New York
City and Las Vegas55 and concluded "[pleople in different
States vary in their tastes and attitudes. 56 Finally, in formulat-
ing its test, the Miller Court referred to "sexual conduct specifi-
cally defined by the applicable state law;"' 57 to pass such a law,
the state legislature must determine, inter alia, the standard of
permissibility.5 Consequently, the relevant law would inherently
reflect statewide standards of offensiveness and prurience.
Specific statewide standards have practical advantages for
both sides in the pornography dispute. 9 Those favoring pornog-
50. United States v. Sandy, 605 F.2d 210, 212 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 984
(1979).
51. United States v. Langford, 688 F.2d 1088, 1096 (7th Cir. 1982), cert. denied, 461
U.S. 959 (1983); United States v. Thomas, 613 F.2d 787, 792 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 449
U.S. 888 (1980). For a more complete discussion, see Waples & White, supra note 38, at
412-13, 429-35.
52. Waples & White, supra note 38, at 408-09.
53. Leventhal, The 1973 Round of Obscenity-Pornography Decisions, 59 A.B.A. J.
1261, 1262 (1973).
54. Case Comment, Obscenity: Determined by Whose Standards? 26 U. FLA. L. REV.
324, 327 (1974); see also Note, Community Standards, supra note 34, at 1842 ("[Miller
noted] it was not constitutional error for a jury to be instructed that the prurient appeal
and patent offensiveness of an allegedly obscene work should be determined by reference
to statewide standards.").
55. Miller v. California, 413 U.S. 15, 32 (1973). As one observer noted, "[tihe juxtapo-
sition of state with metropolitan area accentuates the vagueness of the opinion on this
score." Note, Constitutional Law-Obscenity-Constituent Elements of Tripartite Def-
inition of Obscenity to be Determined by Applying Contemporary Community Stan-
dards, Not National Standards, 23 EMORY L.J. 551, 561 (1974).
56. Miller, 413 U.S. at 33 (emphasis added).
57. Id. at 24.
58. Some restrictions on legislative discretion in this area exist. Smith v. United
States, 431 U.S. 291, 299-308 (1976); supra note 38.
59. The practicai advantages for both prosecutor and defendant of statewide stan-
dards are discussed in Edelstein & Mott, Collateral Problems in Obscenity Regulation:
A Uniform Approach to Prior Restraints, Community Standards, and Judgment Pre-
clusion, 7 SETON HALL L. REV. 543, 568-71 (1976); see also Fahringer, The Defense of an
Obscenity Prosecution, TRIAL at 32, 33 (May 1978) (complaining that utilizing local stan-
dards constitutes "an open invitation for jurors to confuse personal distaste with pruri-
ent appeal. It also encourages jurors to become puritanical and to suppress materials
without any objective basis.").
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raphy restrictions might prefer the relative uniformity statewide
standards bring;60 a patchwork approach, caused by township or-
dinances or zoning restrictions, virtually assures that overall
standards will be eroded over time. 1
Distributors of the material have an incentive to prefer state-
wide standards as well. Different standards in each town (or
each part of the same town) create considerable uncertainty for
distributors; economies of scale favor the larger distribution sys-
tem. The same chilling effect might adversely affect the mass
media in general.2 The defense burden at trial is heavier for a
local than a state standard. 3 Statewide standards may provide
the best balance achievable between the right of the media to
disseminate information, the right of artists and authors to ex-
pand the boundaries of culture, and the right of the people at
large to protect their persons and their sensibilities.
II. JUDICIAL OPINION ON CIVIL RIGHTS-BASED
ANTIPORNOGRAPHY ORDINANCES: Hudnut REVISITED
Despite the evidence that pornography harms women, 4 the
courts have not welcomed the new generation of anti-
pornography laws. In the most prominent decision to date,
American Booksellers Ass'n v. Hudnut, an Indiana federal dis-
trict court 5 and the Seventh Circuit 6 raised several objections
to the civil rights-based pornography ordinance adopted in Indi-
anapolis: it was unconstitutionally vague, 7 and it would tempt
other groups to seek similar ordinances.6 8 They identified several
problems with the ordinance: (1) it defined pornography as con-
60. See Myers, supra note 38, at 327 (discussing lack of uniformity if local "commu-
nity standards" are used).
61. For a discussion on the zoning approach to pornography restrictions, see Fried-
man, Zoning "Adult" Movies: The Potential Impact of Young v. American Mini Thea-
ters, 28 HASTINGS L.J. 1293 (1977); REPORT, supra note 2, at 385-91.
62. See Myers, supra note 38, at 326-27 (noting that local standards lack objectivity
and are difficult to determine).
63. Id. at 329. Under local standards, the government need not present any evidence
of local community standards. Id. at 328. Myers also believes local standards compound
the problems for an appellate court on review. Id. at 327-28. Cf. Jenkins v. Georgia, 418
U.S. 153, at 160-61 (1974) (indicating that jury findings of patent offensiveness will be
closely reviewed).
64. See supra note 4.
65. 598 F. Supp. 1316 (S.D. Ind. 1984).
66. 771 F.2d 323 (1985), aff'd, 475 U.S. 1001 (1986).
67. Hudnut, 598 F. Supp. at 1337-39.
68. Id. at 1337. Other courts have hinted at a similar problem: an ordinance would
open the way for masses of disgruntled women to flood the courts with suits for damages.
See Tigue, Civil Rights and Censorship-Incompatible Bedfellows, 11 WM. MITCHELL L.
REV. 81, 105-06 (1985).
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duct and discrimination, which it clearly was not; 9 (2) it strayed
too far beyond the boundaries of Miller, ignoring the terms con-
tained therein and neglecting the "serious literary, artistic, polit-
ical or scientific value" test;70 (3) it did not require an individual
to show specific injury before bringing an individual lawsuit;7'
(4) the explicit political goals 72 of the ordinance set a poor prece-
dent-every politically weak group might seek such protection;
73
(5) several of the terms the ordinance used, such as "subordina-
tion of women," are unconstitutionally vague;74 and (6) it al-
lowed prior restraints without procedural due process.75
The central and most important objection was that "[t]he or-
dinance discriminates on the ground of the content of the
speech. . . . The state may not ordain preferred viewpoints in
this way. The Constitution forbids the state to declare one per-
spective right and silence opponents. '76 The courts refused to
approve the legislation of attitudes: "If there is any fixed star in
our constitutional constellation, it is that no official, high or
petty, can prescribe what shall be orthodox in politics, national-
ism, religion, or other matters of opinion or force citizens to con-
fess by word or act their faith therein.
77
Merely labeling antipornography ordinances as dangerous en-
croachments on first amendment rights ignores the rights of
those harmed by pornography. Feminists have attacked rights
analysis as being at best indeterminate and at worst self-defeat-
69. Hudnut, 598 F. Supp. at 1330-31. The Indianapolis ordinance defined pornogra-
phy as conduct and discrimination. INDIANAPOLIS IND. CODE § 16-1(a)(2) (1984). This cat-
egorization suited the political aims of the ordinance drafters, but it is not accurate le-
gally. Although pornography production is conduct, and it may cause discrimination, the
end product of the production process is exactly that-a product. Whether pornography
is ultimately classified as an ordinary product or as speech (either protected or unpro-
tected), it cannot be categorized as discrimination. A horse does not become a camel by
changing its name. See Emerson, Pornography and the First Amendment: A Reply to
Professor MacKinnon, 3 YALE L. & POL'y REV. 130, 137 (1984).
70. American Booksellers Ass'n v. Hudnut, 771 F.2d 323, 331 (1985), aff'd, 475 U.S.
1001 (1986).
71. Id. at 326.
72. See infra notes 166, 179-82 and accompanying text.
73. American Booksellers Ass'n v. Hudnut, 598 F. Supp. 1316, 1337 (S.D. Ind. 1984).
74. Id. at 1337-38.
75. Id. at 1340-41.
76. American Booksellers Ass'n v. Hudnut, 771 F.2d 323, 325 (1985), aff'd, 475 U.S.
1001 (1986).
77. Id. at 327 (quoting West Virginia State Bd. of Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624,
642 (1943)).
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ing for women.78 Professor Frances Olsen points out that rights
analysis juxtaposes the right to freedom and the right to security
without providing any way to choose between the two: "Rights
theory does not indicate which of the two values-freedom or
security-the decisionmaker should choose in a given case. Be-
cause it cannot transcend this fundamental conflict of values,
rights theory does not offer an adequate basis for legal deci-
sions. "79 The courts' formulation already contained a conclusion
that a valid speech interest is at stake.
The district court compared the definition of pornography in
the ordinance with categories of traditionally unprotected
speech and concluded that because the ordinance definition of
pornography reached beyond the traditional boundaries of ob-
scenity,80 the ordinance was unconstitutional. The court seemed
to accept the idea that "obscenity harms people,"81 but it side-
stepped the question of whether and to what extent pornogra-
78. Olsen, Statutory Rape: A Feminist Critique of Rights Analysis, 63 TEx. L. REV.
387 (1984). According to Olsen:
"Only by ignoring at least half the rights that could be asserted can rights rheto-
ric even appear to solve concrete problems. Id. at 391.
[T]hinking in terms of rights encourages a partial and inadequate analysis of
sexuality. Just as rights theory conceptualizes a society composed of self-inter-
ested individuals whose conflicting interests are mediated by the state, it con-
ceptualizes the problem of sexuality as a question of where social controls should
end and sexual freedom begin. Id. at 389.
Unfortunately, feminists who set out to discuss sexuality find their arguments
trivialized into a line-drawing debate. Id. at 389-90.
In this way, feminists who are or should be engaged in a joint or parallel project
of challenging the dominant definition of sexuality come to perceive themselves
as opposing one another.
Id. at 390.
79. Id. at 388-89; see also MacKinnon, supra note 4, at 25-26. Which right ought to
win depends on value judgments, not rights analysis. One commentator suggests that
conflicting rights can be balanced against each other to determine the proper outcome.
Katz, Regulating Obscenity, 5 WHITTIER L. REV. 1, 11 (1983); see also MacKinnon, supra
note 4, at 26. Katz's approach, however, also leads to value judgments: what weight
should be given to each right in the weighing of the rights? Most attempts to weigh
rights make pitiful abstractions out of the truly gruesome crimes that pornography
causes or incites: women are beaten, raped, and even murdered. Whatever free expres-
sion value pornography possesses seems minimal in the face of that harm. The injustice
is even clearer when the observer recognizes that the value on the side of the
pornographer is generally free enterprise, not free expression. In other words, rights anal-
ysis is conclusive only when one ignores half of the rights that could be asserted in a
given conflict.
The Hudnut decisions suffer from the facile application of rights analysis that Olsen
describes. The district court defined the conflict this way: "This litigation, therefore,
requires the Court to weigh and resolve the conflict between the First Amendment guar-
antees of free speech, on the one hand, and the Fourteenth Amendment right to be free
from sex-based discrimination, on the other hand." Hudnut, 598 F. Supp. at 1327.
80. Hudnut, 598 F. Supp. at 1332.
81. Id. at 1337.
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phy harms women. Judge Barker conceded that "there may be
many good reasons to support legislative action," but concluded
that "[t]his Court cannot legitimately embark on judicial policy-
making, carving out a new exception to the First Amendment
simply to uphold the Ordinance. ' 82 The district court concluded,
without explanation, that sex discrimination is not a compelling
state interest justifying an exception to the first amendment.13
The court did not hesitate to predict the ruin of civil liberties
that would follow in the wake of the ordinance,8" but it exercised
much less imagination when describing the harm pornography
inflicts on women. Indeed, the court was uncomfortable with the
idea that pornography harms women, suggesting that the effects
of pornography can be avoided or otherwise guarded against.8 5
Although the district court was reluctant to recognize that
pornography might cause harm, the Seventh Circuit was quick
to make that admission:
Therefore we accept the premises of this legislation.
Depictions of subordination tend to perpetuate subordi-
nation. The subordinate status of women in turn leads to
affront and lower pay at work, insult and injury at home,
battery and rape on the streets. . . . Yet this simply
demonstrates the power of pornography as speech. 6
The court's statement contains a conclusion about the relative
value of the interests being weighed. 7 It implicitly weighs
women's rights to security against the pornographer's right to
82. Id. The court never addressed why the harm-to-society rationale, used to justify
expansions of traditional obscenity regulation in Ferber and Pacifica, does not apply
with equal force to pornography. The analogy is not perfect-Ferber and Pacifica are
concerned with the special need to protect children-but it is illuminating. Moreover,
the horrifying prevalence of violent crimes against women and the existence of special
laws designed to deter these crimes show that a special need to protect women exists.
83. Id. at 1342.
84. Id. at 1335-37, 1339. The court foresaw a swift trip down the slippery slope to
total destruction of the first amendment: abuse of the precedent by interest groups to
gain power; the erosion of freedom and the consequent danger of tyrannic rule; and the
effective banning of valuable books. Id.
85. Id. at 1334.
86. American Booksellers Ass'n v. Hudnut, 771 F.2d 323, 329 (1985), aff'd, 475 U.S.
1001 (1986).
87. Discussion of the rights on the other side of the scale is beyond the scope of this
inquiry. These rights include the right to be free from sexual harassment at home and in
the workplace; the right of women to personal security; the right to justice, especially in
rape and sexual harassment trials; the right to be free from libel; and the right of actors
and actresses to be free from economic and sexual exploitation by pornography produc-
ers. See generally MacKinnon, supra note 4; A. DWORKIN, PORNOGRAPHY: MEN POSSESS-
ING WOMEN (1981).
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print or film what he pleases. The argument assumes a proposi-
tion that it can not prove: that speech is worth protecting, re-
gardless of the consequences, so long as it does not fall into one
of the categories customarily viewed as unprotected by the first
amendment. The court described various types of harmful
speech that are protected under the first amendment, including
pornography. 8 The court never drew a line, however, between
harmful, protected speech and harmful, unprotected speech. It
did not explain why some pornography should be unprotected
on the basis of its sexually explicit content and other pornogra-
phy, equally or more harmful, should remain protected.
Another disturbing aspect of the district court opinion and, to
a somewhat lesser extent, the Seventh Circuit opinion, is the
way the conflict between rights was quickly abstracted from the
context of sexual inequality. Both courts devoted much discus-
sion to the value of speech and the harmful consequences of re-
stricting speech,8 9 but they did not accord the same treatment to
women's rights. The courts spoke abstractly of "sex-based dis-
crimination," "social harm," and "women's status," and weighed
these considerations against "our fundamental freedoms as a
people."90 Although the Seventh Circuit nodded in the direction
of more specific harms, such as rape and battery,91 neither court
explained why these and other harms to women were not suffi-
ciently compelling to justify an exception to full first amend-
ment protection.
The courts, after recognizing the possibility that pornography
harms women, ultimately failed to seriously measure the depth
of the harm, and further failed to balance that harm against first
amendment considerations. Put in these terms, the decision is
not as clear, the judgment not as evident as it seemed to the
Hudnut courts. The courts did not give balanced and full con-
sideration to all of the relevant rights, nor could they provide a
convincing basis for their preference for first amendment free-
doms over women's right to security. The possible future loss of
civil liberties envisioned by the courts92 is no worse than the
very present, very real suffering of women.
88. Hudnut, 771 F.2d at 329.
89. Id. at 331-33; Hudnut, 598 F. Supp. at 1327.
90. E.g., Hudnut, 598 F. Supp. at 1327. Interestingly, the court seems oblivious to the
idea that women's rights (including the right to be free from rape or battery) might be
considered part of "our fundamental freedoms as a people."
91. Hudnut, 771 F.2d at 329.
92. Hudnut, 598 F. Supp. at 1337.
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III. THE JUSTIFICATION FOR FURTHER LEGISLATIVE ACTION
Legislative action to regulate pornography has both theoreti-
cal underpinning and historical constitutional precedent. Por-
nography restrictions will not seriously threaten other types of
speech, and rationales invoked to protect other types of speech
do not apply to pornography. Present obscenity law provides
sufficient latitude for the legislative branch to move farther
against pornography.
A. The Legislature May Expand the Boundaries of
Pornography Regulation
Laws impinging on expression strike a raw nerve in constitu-
tional jurisprudence and are treated harshly by the judiciary.
For example, when the Indianapolis City Council passed a
much-publicized antipornography ordinance, their explicit in-
tent was to protect women from the harms pornography causes.
Traditionally, protecting the health and welfare of the citizenry
is one of the state's highest functions, one the courts grant a
high degree of deference. The Indiana federal district court,
however, found any harm pornography causes women irrelevant
because it decided that the legislature may not expand the tradi-
tional boundaries of obscenity regulation or the traditional ratio-
nales advanced for it.93
The court's argument is a common one in the pornography de-
bate,94 but it has several flaws. First, it begins by assuming what
it must prove: that pornography is protected speech. A review of
Miller and related opinions and authorities95 reveals that much,
if not most, material labelled "pornography" is legally obscene,
and so is not protected by the first amendment.96
93. Hudnut, 598 F. Supp. at 1332-35. This view was also advanced by several people
who testified before the Attorney General's Commission. REPORT, supra note 2, at 355-
58.
94. See, e.g., Tigue, supra note 68, at 91-94.
95. See Miller v. California, 413 U.S. 15, 18-19 n.2 (1973); infra notes 127-29 and
accompanying text.
96. New York v. Ferber, 458 U.S. 747, 764 (1982); Miller, 413 U.S. at 23; Kois v.
Wisconsin, 408 U.S. 229 (1972); United States v. Reidel, 402 U.S. 351, 354 (1971); Roth v.
United States, 354 U.S. 476, 484-85 (1957). The Court declared in Chaplinsky v. New
Hampshire, 315 U.S. 568, 571-72 (1942), that certain types of expression are not pro-
tected speech. These include libel, "fighting words," and obscenity. The connecting
thread, as the Court noted, is that these are examples of low value speech. They contrib-
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Second, the argument implicitly assumes that the goal of anti-
pornography ordinances is to impose morality, not redress harm.
This assumption avoids asking the hard question of whose rights
should prevail in a clash of rights. Several prominent jurists
have made this mistake, claiming that it is improper to "legislate
attitudes"-effectively ignoring countervailing civil rights viola-
tions.9 7 The Hudnut court observed that "[the] power to limit
speech on the ground that truth has not yet prevailed and is not
likely to prevail implies the power to declare truth."9 But the
primary aim of civil rights-based ordinances is not to declare the
"truth" of sexual equality; the aim is to protect the existing con-
stitutional rights of female United States citizens, rights that
pornography violates.99
ute little or nothing to finding truth, artistic expression, or any of the other justifications
traditionally advanced in favor of free speech.
97. See Miller, 413 U.S. at 40-41 (Douglas, J. dissenting); ACKERMAN, SOCIAL JUSTICE
IN THE LIBERAL STATE 10-12 (1980); Comment, Feminism, Pornography, and Law, 133 U.
PA. L. REV. 497, 505-07 (1985).
98. American Booksellers Ass'n v. Hudnut, 771 F.2d 323, 330 (1985), afJ'd, 475 U.S.
1001 (1986).
99. This view contains a related problem: the courts assume in protecting pornogra-
phy that they are not declaring one perspective to be correct, a position they say the
Constitution forbids. Id. at 328-32. In fact, that is exactly what the courts are doing.
Comment, Feminism, Pornography, and Law, supra note 97, at 531 ("In the feminist
account current noninterference with individual liberties is not really neutral; rather, it
is an endorsement of the status quo ... [which] itself is a male construct that inhibits
the equality of women."). Pornography silences women; it prevents them from asserting
their own individual dignity and choice. See A. DWORKIN, supra note 87; Note, Anti-
Pornography Laws and First Amendment Values, 98 HARV. L. REv. 460, 475 (1984).
On the other hand, antipornography ordinances speak. They acknowledge that certain
depictions of women are harmful, and that this harm is so egregious that it must not be
allowed. When a court declares that the speech of pornographers is more valuable than
the speech of a community as articulated in an antipornography ordinance, it directly
implies that a world that permits admittedly harmful speech is preferable to a world that
restricts speech based on its harmful effects. In declaring an antipornography ordinance
unconstitutional, the court restricts a community's expression of the relative seriousness
of the harms involved in favor of the court's own worldview. The courts allow restrictions
on speech when it presents a "clear and present danger" or "incites to lawless action."
This indicates that they consider the harm to women from pornography less important
than the harm to society that might result from many other types of speech. The empiri-
cal data supporting this conclusion and the value judgments entailed are more properly
the province of the legislature than the judiciary.
The courts also assume that something is inherently wrong with using law to make a
statement about the kind of society we want. Hudnut, 598 F. Supp. at 1335. The Su-
preme Court did exactly that in racism cases like Brown v. Board of Educ. By making de
jure school segregation illegal, the Court made a moral as well as a legal pronouncement:
racism is no longer acceptable. Law is not independent of the moral and political desires
of those who make and interpret laws; therefore, the argument that we may not use law
to declare an "orthodox" point of view seems disingenuous. Civil rights law may not
restrict speech content, but it certainly may be seen as "forc[ing] citizens to confess by
word or act their faith [in a point of view]," at least in a negative sense. West Virginia
State Bd. of Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624, 642 (1943). Although the law cannot en-
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Finally, the Supreme Court has permitted limitations on ex-
pression in selected cases to prevent harm. It upheld a New
York ban on child pornography on the grounds that it harmed
children without presenting any empirical proof or showing that
the individuals depicted in the material at issue were actually
harmed. 100 Tort law permits monetary recovery for slander per
se without proving actual damages.10 1 Vulgar language may be
prohibited in certain contexts without any showing of harm to
the public morals.102 Although the above examples can be differ-
entiated as special cases, there is a unifying principle: in each
case, the Court allowed the legislature to assume (or the Court
itself assumed) that harm would result;103 empirical studies sup-
porting the propositions were not required.0 4
In several of the above examples, the government or the Court
used law to educate as well as to redress harm. The legislature is
not merely a reactive body; legislative acts often cause social
change. The government can lead social change by deciding
community standards as a legislative determination, which in
turn will educate and change public behavior. This approach has
been used before; as discussed further infra, legislatures have
often created or extended free speech exceptions to cover situa-
tions involving harmful speech.
force tolerance, it can outlaw acts of bigotry-acts that for the actor express personal
and perhaps highly cherished beliefs. See, e.g., Katzenbach v. McClung, 379 U.S. 294
(1964); Heart of Atlanta Motel v. United States, 379 U.S. 241 (1964); Brown v. Board of
Educ., 347 U.S. 483 (1954). Legal sanctions imply that a matter is so compelling that it
cannot be left to individual whim. If the law takes racism seriously, people will take
racism seriously. The same concept applies to sex discrimination and pornography; as
feminist Andrea Dworkin simply but eloquently notes, "Law educates." Dworkin,
Against the Male Flood: Censorship, Pornography, and Equality, 8 HARV. WOMEN's L. J.
1, 23 (1985). The progress that has been made against racism testifies to the law's power
to educate, to declare the goals of a culture.
For a thoughtful comparison of racism and sexism, see MacKinnon, supra note 4, at 8-
10.
100. New York v. Ferber, 458 U.S. 747 (1982).
101. See PROSSER & KEETON ON TORTS, 788-93, § 112 (5th ed. 1984).
102. F.C.C. v. Pacifica Found., 438 U.S. 726 (1978).
103. See supra notes 99-101.
104. See Paris Adult Theater I v. Slaton, 413 U.S. 49, 58 n.8, 60-61 (1973); Note,
Anti-Pornography Laws and First Amendment Values, supra note 99, at 478. By con-
trast, no such assumptions are required regarding pornography; a great number of pub-
lished studies discuss the link between pornography and violence against women. See
supra note 4; Griffin, Women, Pornography and the First Amendment, STUDENT LAW.
Dec. 1980 at 24, 45-46. MacKinnon also cites a long list of cases in which the Supreme
Court held a speech interest less important than the potential harm. MacKinnon, supra
note 4, at 28 n.50.
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B. Other Categories of Restricted Speech
The idea that the legislature can restrict speech to avert cer-
tain harms is not novel. Several types of harmful speech besides
obscenity may be prohibited. The Supreme Court has long per-
mitted governmental restrictions on political speech if that
speech incites people to imminent lawless action."0 5 The "clear
and present danger" speech test is strict-the speech must con-
stitute incitement to imminent action, not merely advocacy of
political change or theory, 00 and the speech must seem likely to
succeed in inciting or producing lawless action. 7 It is clear from
Brandenburg v. Ohio, however, that if grave harm is incited and
threatened, even political speech may be suppressed. Nor is the
Brandenburg "clear and present danger" speech restriction
unique; the Court has upheld several newer categories of free
speech exceptions.
1. Group Libel- One nonprotected speech category that
pornography resembles is libel.'08 Traditionally, libel had to be
directed at an identifiable person to be actionable. In Beauhar-
nais v. Illinois,109 the Supreme Court recognized libel of an en-
tire group as a wrong that the state may redress."' The Beau-
105. See Dennis v. United States, 341 U.S. 494, 511 (1951); Schenck v. United
States, 249 U.S. 47, 52 (1919); cf. Brandenburg v. Ohio, 395 U.S. 444, 447 (1969).
106. Brandenburg, 395 U.S. at 447-49; Yates v. United States, 354 U.S. 298, 324-25
(1957).
107. Brandenburg, 395 U.S. at 447; see also Watts v. United States, 394 U.S. 705,
707-08 (1969).
108. "Pornography is the vehicle for the dissemination of a deep and vicious lie about
women. It is defamatory and libelous." Longino, Pornography, Oppression, and Free-
dom: A Closer Look, in TAKE BACK THE NIGHT 40, 48 (L. Lederer ed. 1980). Feminists
have cited the libelous nature of pornography as a rationale for pornography regulation.
Note, Anti-Pornography Laws and First Amendment Values, supra note 99, at 467;
Comment, Feminism, Pornography, and Law, supra note 97, at 523; see also Jacobs,
Patterns of Violence: A Feminist Perspective on the Regulation of Pornography, 7
HARV. WOMEN'S L.J. 5, 53-54 (1984). Some critics of pornography regulation based on a
libel theory maintain that the way to fight untrue pornographic "speech" is with more
speech. L. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 731 (1978). The feminist response is
that pornography silences women, and devalues their speech. MacKinnon, supra note 4,
at 63; see also A. DWORKIN 1 supra n.87; Note, Anti-Pornography Laws and First
Amendment Values, supra n.99.
109. 343 U.S. 250 (1952).
110. Id. at 258. Canada has a similar law in effect. See Criminal Code, CAN. REV.
STAT. ch. C-34, § 281.2 (Martin 1988). Great Britain recognizes group libel as actionable.
See King v. Osborne, reported in 94 Eng. Rep. 406, 425; 36 Eng. Rep. 705, 717; 25 Eng.
Rep. 584 (1732); The Times (London), March 26, 1952, at 2, col. 4. So have several
states; see, e.g. People v. Spielman, 318 Ill. 482, 486, 149 N.E. 466, 469 (1925). For fur-
ther discussion of group libel, see Beth, Group Libel and Free Speech, 39 MINN. L. REV.
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harnais Court allowed the legislature to extend an existing
speech exception to cover a new area."'
2. Child Pornography- Creating an entirely new speech ex-
ception, the Supreme Court in New York v. Ferber"2 declared
that child pornography is not protected speech. Ferber involved
a New York statute that prohibited using children in porno-
graphic films or pictures and distributing the material, even
though those films or pictures might not themselves be obscene
under the Miller test. The Court based its decision on the need
to protect children from harm." 3 Significantly, the Court noted
that its goal extended beyond protecting the participants to pro-
tecting youthful viewers." 4 Thus, in order to protect youth, the
Court permitted the government to restrict certain pornographic
material sold to adults." 5 In view of the minimal literary, scien-
tific, or educational value of these materials," 6 the Court found
that the state had the power to ban child pornography, not
merely to restrict access by juveniles or regulate the age of the
performers.
167 (1955); Riesman, Democracy and Defamation: Control of Group Libel, 42 COLUM. L.
REV. 727 (1942); Tanenhaus, Group Libel, 35 CORNELL L.Q. 261 (1950).
111. The purpose of raising Beauharnais is to demonstrate that the Court allowed
the legislature to extend a traditional speech exception, libel, for a good purpose; the
continuing vitality of the case is not being defended. Whether a disclaimer is necessary is
unclear; some courts have questioned the vitality of Beauharnais (see, e.g., Collin v.
Smith, 578 F.2d 1197, 1204 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 916 (1978)), but the Su-
preme Court continues to rely on it. See Bose Corp. v. Consumers Union of United
States, Inc., 466 U.S. 485, 504 (1984); New York v. Ferber, 458 U.S. 747, 763 (1982);
Smith v. Collin, 436 U.S. 953 (1978) (Blackmun, J., dissenting from a denial of a stay to
a court of appeals order, joined by Rehnquist, J.). Moreover, several commentators be-
lieve group libel doctrine is not, or should not be, dead. See, e.g., Note, Group Vilifica-
tion Reconsidered, 89 YALE L.J. 308 (1979); cf. Delgado, Words that Wound: A Tort
Action for Racial Insults, Epithets, and Name-Calling, 17 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 133
(1982).
112. 458 U.S. 747 (1982).
113. Id. at 759 n.10.
114. Id. at 756-57; see also Kaplan v. California, 413 U.S. 115, 120 (1973); Paris Adult
Theatre I v. Slaton, 413 U.S. 49, 58 n.7 (1973) (noting that because books are portable
and durable, simply banning children from adult moviehouses does not adequately pro-
tect juveniles); REPORT OF THE COMMISSION ON OBSCENITY AND PORNOGRAPHY 401 (1970)
(Hill-Link Minority Report) (citing the comparatively heavy use of pornographic mate-
rial by young persons).
115. See also F.C.C. v. Pacifica Found., 438 U.S. 726, 739-41, (1978) (permitting gov-
ernment to restrict the broadcasting of nonobscene offensive language, in part because of
danger children might hear it).
116. "We consider it unlikely that visual depictions of children performing sexual
acts or lewdly exhibiting their genitals would often constitute an important and neces-
sary part of a literary performance or scientific or educational work." New York v. Fer-
ber, 458 U.S. 747, 762-63 (1982).
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Although the case of children is distinguishable,11" 7 the logic is
equally compelling when applied to adult women: if legislatures
may prohibit child pornography because of the special need to
protect children, then they should also be able to prohibit vio-
lent pornography because of the special need to protect adult
women from sex-related violence, coercion, and sex discrimina-
tion."'8 The state's police power can no more protect the victims
117. The significance of this distinction is uncertain. The Supreme Court has always
maintained that the state has legitimate interests in regulating obscene material beyond
the interest in protecting children and unconsenting adults. Paris Adult Theatre 1, 413
U.S. at 57; Miller v. California, 413 U.S. 15, 18-20 (1973); Stanley v. Georgia, 394 U.S.
557, 567 (1969). Moreover, the harm of child pornography probably cannot be effectively
eradicated without also addressing adult pornography. See MacKinnon, supra note 4, at
38, n.77 (1985); Burgess, Hartman, McCausland & Powers, Response Patterns in Chil-
dren and Adolescents Exploited Through Sex Rings and Pornography, 141 AM. J. Psy-
CHIATRY 656, 657-58 (1984) (documenting instances where money from sale of photos is
used as an inducement to young participants); REPORT, supra note 2, at 411-413, 782-86,
788.
118. See Gershel, Evaluating a Proposed Civil Rights Approach to Pornography: Le-
gal Analysis as if Women Mattered, 11 WM. MITCHELL L. REV. 41, 71-72 (1985) (special
need to protect persons coerced into performing in pornography). Children have histori-
cally been treated differently by the law and by society than adults (men and women).
For obvious reasons, children have fewer rights and less freedom, and the state has
adopted a paternalistic attitude regarding their protection. The Ferber court held that
the state may protect children from the evils of child pornography because children are
unable to protect themselves. Women are similarly unable to protect themselves against
sex discrimination and sexual violence. This does not mean courts should apply the stan-
dards relevant to children to women across the board. Rather, where a historically op-
pressed or helpless group is concerned, greater than ordinary remedies may be required
to administer true justice. The exact form of the remedy depends on the individual case.
Although the differences in the positions of women and children are clear-women
vote, they are educated, they are physically stronger, and psychologically more indepen-
dent-the similarities of women and children with respect to the harms of pornography
are quite compelling. The actors who produce the material are exploited, both physically
and economically. L. LOVELACE, ORDEAL (1981); REPORT, supra note 2, at 837-900 and the
numerous sources cited therein. Also, they often suffer severe psychological harm. RE-
PORT, supra note 2, at 837-900. Other women are also victimized, with resulting physical
and mental harm. Jacobs, supra note 108, at 7-25; Baldwin, The Sexuality of Inequality:
The Minneapolis Pornography Ordinance, 2 LAW AND INEQUALITY 629, 637-40 (1984) and
sources cited therein; REPORT, supra note 2, at 767-835 and sources cited therein. The
harms include rape, forced sexual performances, sodomy, prostitution and the related
danger of sexually transmitted diseases, incest, other child sexual abuse, suicidal
thoughts and behavior, lesser mental harms, lowered self-esteem, and continued sexual
dysfunction. Id. Pornography also causes economic harm to women through forced por-
nographic performances and pornography-induced or inspired sex discrimination. MacK-
innon, supra note 4, at 39 n.80-81 and accompanying text; REPORT, supra note 2, at 826-
35 and sources cited therein.
The logic developed in Ferber regarding the rights of children, and in Brown and other
race discrimination cases regarding the rights of minorities, demands parallel treatment
to protect the rights of women. See MacKinnon, supra note 4, at 25-26. To hold other-
wise is to say in effect to women, "the state has a compelling interest in protecting chil-
dren and eradicating race discrimination, an interest sufficient to override first amend-
ment rights, but you women cannot come to the courts for similar protection. Protecting
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of pornography-induced sexual abuse and exploitation without
restricting pornography than it could protect the victims of child
sexual abuse caused by child pornography without a similar
ban." 9
C. Pornography is Not Political Speech
One of the most forceful arguments advanced against statu-
tory pornography restrictions is that the Court's approach to
past first amendment exceptions amounts to piecemeal hacking
away at the first amendment. 1 0 Speech serves multiple values
simultaneously-political, expressive, artistic-and separating or
ranking these values is not always easy. 2' The most compelling
reason not to grant the legislature control over community stan-
dards is that pornography is entitled to the same protection as
political speech,122 so the government may not ban it no matter
how much harm it causes.'
the bodies of children is more important than protecting your bodies; protecting the
opportunities of racial minorities is more important than protecting your opportunities."
119. The Court found that nothing short of a ban would accomplish the goal:
The most expeditious if not the only practical method of law enforcement may
be to dry up the market for this material by imposing severe criminal penalties
on persons selling, advertising, or otherwise promoting the product. Thirty-five
States and Congress have concluded that restraints on the distribution of porno-
graphic materials are required in order to effectively combat the problem, and
there is a body of literature and testimony to support these legislative
conclusions.
Ferber, 458 U.S. at 760.
120. See English, The Politics -of Porn: Can Feminists Walk the Line?, MOTHER
JONES April 1980 at 20, 23, 44-48; see also Dworkin, Is There a Right to Pornography?, 1
OXFORD J. LEGAL STUD. 177 (1981).
121. This argument implies that pornography has some value initially. Some theorists
refuse to go even that far. Chafee, for example, based his justification of first amendment
protection on the value of speech, and reached the conclusion that pornography is enti-
tled to little protection because it is low value speech: "[Pirofanity and indecent talk and
pictures, which do not form an essential part of any exposition of ideas, have a very
slight social value as a step toward truth, which is clearly outweighed by. . .social inter-
ests .. " CHAFEE, FREE SPEECH IN THE UNITED STATES 150 (1941).
122. See Miller v. California, 413 U.S. 15, 42-47 (1973) (Douglas, J., dissenting); Wall-
sgrove, Feminist Anti-Censorship Taskforce: The case against Indianapolis, OFF OUR
BACKS, June 1985 at 12: "[Als all feminists agree, sex is political; we should therefore
argue that its expression needs more protection than it currently has." Id. at 13 (empha-
sis in original). This argument holds that because sex is political, pornography is political
speech, especially insofar as it implicitly or explicitly advocates imbalanced power rela-
tionships. Id.
123. Comment, Feminism, Pornography, and Law, supra note 97, at 528-29; Press,
supra note 12, at 66; Hunter & Law, Amicus Curiae Brief of the Feminist Anti-Censor-
ship Taskforce and the Women's Legal Defense Ass'n Fund, In Opposition to the Indi-
anapolis Ordinance, American Booksellers Ass'n v. Hudnut, 771 F.2d 323 (7th Cir.
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This argument fails to persuade. The government may restrict
even political speech, the most zealously protected kind, if it di-
rectly incites violence.124 Certainly pornography is entitled to no
more protection than political speech.12 5 The Supreme Court
does not even consider them in the same league.'
D. Pornography Equals Obscenity
Another argument of those opposed to pornography restric-
tions is that pornography is not obscenity. 27 Although distinc-
tions can be drawn between pornography and obscenity, 2 ' in
practice, the Supreme Court's conception of obscenity has
amounted to what commonly is considered hard-core pornogra-
phy. '2 The purported distinction never meant much; when past
courts differentiated pornography and obscenity, they were try-
1985), aff'd, 475 U.S. 1001 (1986); see Kaminer, Pornography and the First Amendment:
Prior Restraints and Private Action, in TAKz BACK THE NIGHT 241 (L. Lederer ed. 1980).
124. Schenck v. United States, 249 U.S. 47, 52 (1919).
125. Pornographers might attack a Schenck analogy by arguing that no strong rela-
tion exists between pornography and the evil feared. This argument is discussed in note
4 supra. Even if this argument is given some credence, it does not surmount the consti-
tutional issue. If pornography is nonprotected speech, to uphold the law a court need
only find sufficient evidence of harm for a rational legislature to conclude that a ban on
pornography might help. Paris Adult Theater I v. Slaton, 413 U.S. 49, 60-61 (1973); see
Part III.G infra. Only if pornography is protected speech must a law restricting it meet
the clear and present danger test. See Miller, 413 U.S. at 42, n.6 (Douglas, J., dissent-
ing); Kaminer, A Woman's Guide to Pornography and the Law, 230 NATION 754, 755
(1980).
126. See, e.g., Young v. American Mini Theaters, 427 U.S. 50 (1976):
[I]t is manifest that society's interest in protecting this type of expression is of a
wholly different, and lesser, magnitude than the interest in untrammeled politi-
cal debate. . . . Whether political oratory or philosophical discussion moves us
to applaud or to despise what is said, every schoolchild can understand why our
duty to defend the right to speak remains the same. But few of us would march
our sons and daughters off to war to preserve the citizen's right to see "Specified
Sexual Activities" exhibited in the theaters of our choice.
427 U.S. at 70 (plurality opinion).
127. Gershel, supra note 118, at 64; see also Emerson, supra note 69, at 134.
128. Gershel, supra note 118, at 64-66.
129. Indeed, in Miller itself, the Supreme Court said that its "obscenity" opinion
referred to pornography:
This Court has defined "obscene material" as "material which deals with sex
in a manner appealing to prurient interest" [citing Roth v. United States, 354
U.S. 476, 487 (1957)]. ...
The material we are discussing in this case is more accurately defined as "por-
nography" or "pornographic material." . . . [Pornography] now means . . . "a
depiction (as in writing or painting) of licentiousness or lewdness: a portrayal of
erotic behavior designed to cause sexual excitement." [citing Webster's Third
New International Dictionary (Unabridged 1969)] . . . We note, therefore, that
the words "obscene material," as used in this case, have a specific judicial mean-
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ing to protect works such as Ulysses.130 The pornography ob-
jected to would be considered obscene by any court following the
obscenity test of Miller.
The best rationale for allowing the legislature to act is that
the Court has always allowed restrictions on this material. With-
out specific statutory standards, however, every public official
takes a risk whenever she makes an obscenity arrest or
seizure;1 's and under present statutes every judge or jury has to
decide the issues de novo. Furthermore, until trial, no one knows
where the line between offensive but permissible material and
material that may be banned lies."3 2 A statutory standard will
provide clearer guidance to the police, the court, and citizens.
Clear standards also reduce the risk to booksellers and movie
producers. Finally, a clear standard removes a contentious trial
issue that would otherwise require tedious discovery; this should
in turn expedite trials.
E. Pornography Bans are More Than Mere Regulations of
Taste
Another criticism of past ordinances is that pornography re-
strictions regulate taste.3' Two responses to this criticism are:
(1) that pornography results in harm is indisputable-the only
argument is over how serious the harm is-so the restrictions are
based on more than taste; and (2) that the government often
regulates taste related to free expression without serious pro-
ing which derives from the Roth case, i.e., obscene material "which deals with
sex."
Miller v. California, 413 U.S. 15, 18, n.2.
The two concepts are not precisely congruent. Not all pornography is obscene under
Miller; and not all obscenity, as the term is commonly understood, is pornographic. The
Miller Court held only that all pornography falling within its test could be banned under
obscenity law. The confusion highlights the need for a specific ordinance such as that
proposed infra; pornography, like any other potentially vague term, must be carefully
defined to avoid overbreadth or vagueness problems. See American Booksellers Ass'n v.
Hudnut, 598 F. Supp. 1316, 1337-40 (S.D. Ind. 1984). For further discussion of the defi-
nitions of pornography and obscenity, see Gershel, supra note 118, at 65-67; cf. Forkosch,
Pornobscenity, Morals, and Judicial Discrimination, 7 CAPITAL U. L.REv. 579 (1978).
130. See supra note 20; cf. Cope, Pornography and Censorship: An Introductory Es-
say, PORNOGRAPHY AND CENSORSHIP 15, 20-21 (1983).
131. See REPORT, supra note 2, at 370-71.
132. For a short discussion of the difficulties involved in prosecuting obscenity cases,
see Kaminer, supra note 125, at 755.
133. English, supra note 120, at 23-24, 43; Griffin, supra note 104, at 27.
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test 3 4 -taste regulation of pornography is not significantly dif-
ferent from other taste regulations in principle.
Of equal importance, the legislature is the proper body to
make these decisions. The legislature is peculiarly suited to
factfinding. Every interested party has an opportunity to be
heard. The citizenry can properly air its concerns-economic,
moral, safety, expressive. In marked contrast, in the trial court
only the parties involved can be heard, and the evidence the
court may hear is highly restricted. In any event, the chance of
enforcement excesses is not enough, by itself, to overrule other-
wise constitutional laws passed by democratically-elected legisla-
tures: "[T]he possibility of abuse is a poor reason for denying
[the state] the power to adopt measures . . . sanctioned by cen-
turies of Anglo-American law.
135
F. Pornography Restrictions are Not the First Step on a
Slippery Slope
In the end, opponents of antipornography ordinances fall back
on the slippery slope argument: if pornography is banned, then
critical political speech will soon be banned as well. 136 The weak-
ness of this argument is exposed by the many restrictions al-
ready tolerated on free speech without seriously impeding politi-
cal discussion. The child pornography restrictions, the clear and
present danger restrictions, and the obscenity and libel laws
have not significantly inhibited political debate. No reason exists
to suppose a pornography restriction will be more damaging.
134. For example, the government regulates taste in the zoning regulations common
in many communities governing house color or fence height. Zoning restrictions on por-
nographic movie houses and bookstores have been upheld by the Supreme Court. See,
e.g., Young v. American Mini Theatres, 427 U.S. 50 (1976). Another example is the re-
striction on broadcasting "dirty words." F.C.C. v. Pacifica Found., 438 U.S. 726 (1978).
135. Beauharnais v. Illinois, 343 U.S. 250, 263 (1952). When the speech causes no
harm, or the harm is outweighed by the benefits, the justification for restricting speech
may be weaker. The former case, however, is inapplicable to pornography, and the latter
case involves a weighing of empirical evidence that seems to be in the discretion of the
legislature.
136. MacKinnon & Hunter, Coming Apart: Feminists and the Conflict over Pornog-
raphy, OFF OUR BACKS at 6, 7-8 (June 1985); Press, supra note 11, at 63.
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G. The Standard of Proof Required for the Legislature to
Act
One extremely important element of the Roth obscenity defi-
nition that survives to the present day determines the standard
that legislative action must meet. If the material is not legally
obscene, any restrictive law must meet the clear and present
danger or compelling interest level of justification. If the mate-
rial is legally obscene under the prevailing obscenity test, how-
ever, the state may restrict it as long as a mere "rational basis"
for the regulation exists, 37 or it is non-obscene but harmful to
children as indicated by Ferber. The Miller Court assumed that
the harm from obscenity was within the capacity of the legisla-
ture to redress. So did the Ferber Court regarding the harm
137. Paris Adult Theatre I v. Slaton, 413 U.S. 49, 60-61 (1973) (quoting Roth v.
United States, 354 U.S. 476, 485 (1957)) (emphasis in original):
It is not for us to resolve empirical uncertainties underlying state legislation
.... Although there is no conclusive proof of a connection between antisocial
behavior and obscene material, the legislature of Georgia could quite reasonably
determine that such a connection does or might exist. In deciding Roth, this
Court implicitly accepted that a legislature could legitimately act on such a con-
clusion to protect "the social interest in order and morality."
Although honest disagreement may remain regarding the precise strength of the corre-
lation between pornography and harm or exactly how harm follows from pornography,
pornography considered obscene under Miller is not protected speech. Miller v. Califor-
nia, 413 U.S. 15, 36-37 (1973). The legislature can therefore conclude that violent por-
nography harms women and may be banned on those grounds.
An analogy to the law of incitement to violence demonstrates this point. A speaker,
holding forth on a political issue, can be muted, arrested, and jailed if his speech is
deemed likely to goad the audience to immediate violent action. Brandenburg v. Ohio,
395 U.S. 444 (1969). The legislature may forbid the speech without conducting substan-
tial factfinding on the link between speech and violence, and the police need not wait
until a riot occurs before arresting the speaker. See Paris Adult Theater I, 413 U.S. at
60-63. A speaker urging his (male) audience to seize, beat, and rape women could be
legally stopped before his words prodded the crowd to such action. The government
could rationally rely upon this principle to prohibit the same message if printed or
filmed. Restriction of printed material deemed likely to incite such actions-like pornog-
raphy, according to the available data on the pornography-violence link (see supra note
4)-falls under this rubric.
Most of the material that a model ordinance ought to ban is already recognizably ob-
scene under the Miller test. A good illustration is provided by the "rape fantasy" depic-
tions, typical in pornography, REPORT, supra note 2, at 323-24, used in several of the
Donnerstein and Malamuth studies on the link between pornography and violence. See
supra note 4. In a typical scenario, an assailant sexually assaults a woman; frightened
and resisting at first, she soon becomes a multiple-orgasmic willing participant. Or imag-
ine the same depiction as the subject of a photo essay. These materials fit into the Miller
criteria: by their own terms, the materials are intended to appeal to prurient interest; the
depictions are patently offensive (especially to women, who make up over 50% of the
population); as long as the work lacks serious literary, artistic, political, or scientific
value, it may be considered obscene. See supra note 28 and accompanying text.
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from child pornography. Asserting that the legislature can exer-
cise similar discretion in drafting a new ordinance to pursue the
types of pornography generally ignored under existing law en-
forcement norms is a straightforward extension of this
precedent.
IV. PROPOSED STANDARDS FOR A NEW ORDINANCE
The current proliferation of pornography, amply documented
in the Attorney General's report and other sources, 38 demon-
strates the need for new antipornography ordinances. A clear
new law would simplify the problems of enforcement. More im-
portant, it would signal law enforcement bodies to take strong
action against harmful forms of pornography. The challenge for
a legislature is to draft a statute that covers all objectionable
material, whether printed, broadcast, or audio-visual, without
exceeding constitutional boundaries. An effective statute, which
covers almost all of the materials banned in the Indianapolis or-
dinance but also conforms to Miller, is a reachable goal.
A. New Statutes Must Conform to Miller
In drafting a new antipornography statute, a legislature must
draw on existing obscenity law. The Indianapolis ordinance
sweepingly expanded the class of prohibited material. As such, it
was a radical departure from past expansions of Miller.1 3e The
Supreme Court has not carved large new chunks out of pro-
tected speech, preferring to create small exceptions or to rede-
fine the borders of an existing exception. The purpose of a new
antipornography ordinance should be to reach material not ef-
fectively restricted at the present time; and some ways of reach-
ing that goal are more acceptable than others. Inevitably, a new
law that draws heavily on a standard enunciated by the Su-
138. REPORT, supra note 2, at 277-97, 323-24; Press, supra note 11, at 58-63, 67. The
industry, which sold over eight billon dollars' worth of material in 1984, is enormous by
any standard. Galloway & Thornton, Crackdown on Pornography-A No-Win Battle,
U.S. NEWS & WORLD REP., June 4, 1984, at 84. There are more sellers of pornographic
videotapes than McDonald's restaurants. In New York alone, dial-a-porn services re-
ceived over 800,000 phone calls per day in 1984, over 180,000,000 calls for the year. RE-
PORT, supra note 2, at 78.
139. See, e.g., New York v. Ferber, 458 U.S. 747 (1982); F.C.C. v. Pacifica Found., 438
U.S. 726 (1978); Young v. American Mini Theaters, 427 U.S. 50 (1976).
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preme Court is more likely to find favor with the Court than one
that flouts previous Court rulings.
The recent Supreme Court decisions in Pope v. Illinois140 and
Hudnut,'4' clarify that any pornography ordinance will have to
conform to the strictures of Miller. As detailed supra, the Miller
test has three elements; material is obscene when it: (1) appeals
to the prurient interest under contemporary community stan-
dards; (2) depicts, in a patently offensive way, conduct specifi-
cally described by the applicable state law; and (3) lacks serious
literary, artistic, political, or scientific value (the "LAPS"
test).,l 2 In dicta the Miller court limited the scope of prohib-
itable obscenity to "hard-core sexual conduct.' 43
Under the "community standards" element, a jury of ordinary
community members must find that the author, producer, or
distributor intended the material to appeal to prurient inter-
est. 1 4 "Prurient interest" is not itself problematic; it is a com-
mon, well-understood legal term, 45 and the qualifying phrase,
"taken as a whole," serves to prevent the government from using
a few lurid passages in an otherwise innocuous book to declare it
obscene.14 1
The "patently offensive" requirement has caused courts some
difficulty,1 47 but it need not frustrate legislative efforts. Patent
offensiveness is a question of community taste.14 1 Who is to be
the arbiter of taste for the community? Miller implies this is a
jury function. Determining patent offensiveness on a case-by-
case basis, however, will lead to nonuniform results, with attend-
ant problems. 1 9 Since offensiveness is a value judgment, the
elected representatives of the community would seem to be in
the best position to make a uniform pronouncement on what is
140. 481 U.S. 497 (1987).
141. 475 U.S. 1001 (1986) (affirmed without hearing).
142. Miller v. California 413 U.S. 15, 24 (1973).
143. Id. at 27.
144. Id. at 30.
145. The term originated in Roth v. United States, 354 U.S. 476, 487 n.20 (1957). See
supra notes 29-30 and accompanying text; see also Brockett v. Spokane Arcades, Inc.,
472 U.S. 491, 494 (1985); United States v. Guglielmi, 819 F.2d 451, 454 (4th Cir. 1987);
Polykoff v. Collins, 816 F.2d 1326, 1335 (9th Cir. 1987); Goldstein v. Allain, 568 F. Supp.
1377, 1385 (N.D. Miss. 1983); MODEL PENAL CODE § 207.10(2) commentary, at 10 (Tent.
Draft No. 6, 1957) (defining intent to appeal to prurient interest as "the capacity to
attract individuals eager for a forbidden look").
146. Roth v. United States, 354 U.S. 476, 489 (1957).
147. See, e.g., American Booksellers Ass'n v. Hudnut, 598 F. Supp. 1316, 1332 (S.D.
Ind. 1984).
148. See Miller v. California, 413 U.S. 15, 33 (1973); Leventhal, supra note 53, at
1262; Case Comment, Obscenity, supra note 54, at 328.
149. See supra notes 58-62 and accompanying text.
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patently offensive under community standards. 1 0 Indeed, part
of the duty of legislators is to create and enforce community
standards of taste and conduct.
The model ordinance proposed infra is innovative in its posi-
tion that a state or community legislature may legitimately say,
via legislation, "We, the elected representatives of the commu-
nity, determine that 'X' representation of sexual conduct is pa-
tently offensive as a matter of law." This permits the community
to determine what is patently offensive, while providing reasona-
ble notice to pornographers of what will be found obscene. The
final judgment of offensiveness versus redeeming value still rests
with the jury, but the ordinance creates a clearer set of guide-
lines for the court, while allowing the community to retain its
voice in the decision.
Miller's dicta contains a "hard-core" limitation; 5' the Hudnut
court criticized the Indianapolis ordinance because it also lim-
ited non-hard-core conduct. 52 In doing so, the Court came peril-
ously close to elevating form above function because neither
Miller nor Hudnut defined "hard-core," instead referring to
"the regulating state law." 153 But not all states include "hard-
core" in their definitions of obscenity. 54 Moreover, "hard-core"
is a term of art which could easily confuse a jury. s The Miller
Court's "hard-core" limitation is not necessary to its holding,
and, undefined, it is not helpful in guiding a jury decision on
obscenity.
The antipornography ordinance proposed below does not con-
tain an explicit "hard-core" limitation. There is substantial dan-
150. Schauer, supra note 32, at 18; cf. Miller, 413 U.S. at 33:
[T]he primary concern with . . . the standard of 'the average person, applying
contemporary community standards' is to be certain that, so far as material is
not aimed at a deviant group, it will be judged by its impact on an average
person, rather than a particularly susceptible or sensitive person-or indeed a
totally insensitive one.
151. Miller, 413 U.S. at 27: "Under the holdings announced today, no one will be
subject to prosecution for the sale or exposure of obscene materials unless these materi-
als depict or describe patently offensive 'hard core' sexual conduct specifically defined by
the regulating state law, as written or construed." The Court uses the term twice more,
id. at 28, 35, but it is not defined either explicitly or by the context of those usages.
152. American Booksellers Ass'n v. Hudnut, 598 F. Supp. 1316, 1332 (S.D. Ind. 1984).
153. Miller, 413 U.S. at 27.
154. For example, the California law upheld in Miller did not include the term
"hard-core." CAL. PENAL CODE § 311 (1969). The Georgia law upheld in Paris Adult The-
ater I also omitted the term. GEORGIA CODE ANN. § 26-2101 (1969).
155. By bombarding the jury with extremely offensive material labelled as "hard-
core," a clever defense attorney could mislead the court into allowing sexually explicit
material that the community would find highly offensive. See Fahringer, supra note 59,
at 33; Myers, supra note 38, at 320 n.29.
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ger that the term will confuse a jury, but little chance it will
clarify the relevant issues. Without resorting to unnecessary
terms, the proposed statute reaches patently offensive sexually
explicit material. In other words, the model ordinance is re-
stricted by its own terms to material that clearly fits within the
Miller Court's conception of "hard-core."' 5
Another important element of Miller is the obscenity excep-
tion that redeems material with serious literary, artistic, politi-
cal, or scientific value (the "LAPS" test).157 The Indianapolis or-
dinance omitted a LAPS test on the ground that pornography
harms women, whether or not there is social value in it.158
Where the pornographic material possesses no substantial coun-
tervailing benefit, no balancing is possible and the Indianapolis
position is sensible. But in a case where the pornographic work
possesses some substantial social value, a reasonable jury ought
to have the latitude to find that the material's harm is mitigated
by its benefits. Furthermore, the material that a LAPS test
would save is probably not the most harmful. 159 A LAPS excep-
tion would not seriously hinder efforts to ban violent pornogra-
phy, and an antipornography ordinance almost certainly cannot
be passed today without one. The model ordinance proposed be-
low includes a LAPS exception.
156. Contrast this to the Indianapolis ordinance, which included conduct that would
clearly not be considered "hard-core."
157. Miller v. California, 413 U.S. 15, 24 (1973).
158. MacKinnon, supra note 4, at 21-22.
159. See REPORT, supra note 2, at 265 (emphasis in original):
[W]e find it difficult to understand how much of the material we have seen can
be considered to be even remotely related to an exchange of views in the market-
place of ideas, to an attempt to articulate a point of view, to an attempt to
persuade, or to an attempt seriously to convey through literary or artistic means
a different vision of humanity or of the world. We do not deny that in a different
context and presented in a different way, material as explicit as that which we
have seen could be said to contain at least some of all of these characteristics.
But we also have no doubt that these goals are remote from the goals of virtually
all distributors or users of this material, and we also have no doubt that these
values are present in most standard pornographic items to an extraordinarily
limited degree.
For example, video tapes that show little more than women enjoying being raped, or
glossy photos of women being beaten, are likely to cause more harm to women at large
than serious discourses on the subordinate status of women which include graphic exam-
ples. See REPORT, supra note 2, at 382-84 (positing that material consisting only of
printed words is less harmful than photographs or films).
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B. Create a Civil Right of Action
The model ordinance provides that individual women may sue
for damages pornography has caused them.16 0 The statute has
two prongs: the state may employ criminal sanctions to restrict
pornography, and private parties may sue in tort for damages
caused by pornography. 6' The tort remedy relies on the basic
tort principle that where A (here, a pornographer) has wrong-
fully harmed B, B has a right to seek monetary damages from A
to compensate her for her injuries.'62 The threat of a civil action
will act as a powerful check on pornography; the pornographer's
minimal fear of often spotty criminal obscenity law enforce-
ment 63 is bolstered by the far more acute fear of paying dam-
ages to woman harmed by a pornographic publication." 4
Some observers believe that an antipornography statute will
result in a flood of litigation because any woman who feels ag-
grieved by pornography may file a lawsuit.6 5 The problem of ex-
cess litigation can be minimized by imposing a restriction consis-
tent with traditional tort law, that an individual bringing suit
under an antipornography ordinance be required to show that
an identifiable piece of pornography caused her some actual
harm. The model ordinance requires this.
American tort law has not sanctioned recovery for imagined or
slight affronts. Pornography does not cause mere injured feel-
ings, but rather causes harm to one woman based on publication
depicting another woman. The theoretical basis behind a blan-
ket ban of such lawsuits is untenable; barring women who claim
and are prepared to prove real damages from court to protect
court dockets is wrong. Seeking redress in the courts for injury is
160. This provision was a central part of the Indianapolis ordinance. INDIANAPOLIS,
IND. CODE §§ 16-17(a), 16-26(7)(b) (1984).
161. See PROSSER & KEETON ON TORTS, § 2 (5th ed. 1984):
The same act may be both a crime against the state and a tort against an indi-
vidual. In such a case, since the interests invaded are not the same, and the
objects to be accomplished by the two suits are different, there may be both a
civil tort action and a criminal prosecution for the same offense.
See also Jacobs, supra note 108, at 52-53.
162. PROSSER & KEETON ON TORTS at 8: "The civil action for a tort . . . is com-
menced and maintained by the injured person, and its primary purpose is to compensate
for the damage suffered, at the expense of the wrongdoer. If successful, the plaintiff re-
ceives a judgment for a sum of money, enforceable against the defendant."
163. See REPORT, supra note 2, at 366-68.
164. MacKinnon, supra note 4, at 29 n.52.
165. See Tigue, supra note 68, at 104-05. Feminists would argue that this is not nec-
essarily a bad thing. See Comment, Feminism, Pornography, and Law, supra note 97, at
524-25.
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a fundamental right, not to be denied due to administrative con-
cerns. For example, no court would be permitted to refuse to
hear civil rights cases on the grounds that racial discrimination
is so commonplace or so easy to allege that the courts would be
burdened by hearing the claims. Similarly, habeas corpus peti-
tions are not denied wholesale because many prisoners wish to
file them. The proposed ordinance provides a statutory frame-
work for redress for women who suffer physical injury or civil
rights violation traceable to pornography.
Furthermore, critics fear that allowing an ordinance that
seems to enable women to improve their political position
through restrictions on free speech could open the way for any
aggrieved group to utilize similar legislation to its own ends."'6
This potential problem did not originate with the Indianapolis
ordinance; it dates back at least to Beauharnais.1 6 7 The objec-
tion surfaced in Hudnut because the ordinance drafters had
broad political goals; they intended to use the antipornography
ordinance as a tool to enhance the power and position of
women. 68 To the extent that the Indianapolis drafters at-
tempted to use the courts rather than the legislature or the
economy to transfer political power, the objection is proper. The
narrower issue is the safety of women and the morality of al-
lowing distribution of pornographic material harmful to women;
the model ordinance pursues these goals alone. Confining the is-
sue in this manner avoids the "slippery slope" problem while
regulating objectionable material.
C. Use Clear Terms
Law must be clearly understood to be effective and equitable;
interested parties must have fair notice of the boundaries of le-
gality. Many of the terms in the Indianapolis ordinance are un-
constitutionally vague. 16 9 Such terms as "subordination of
women," "inferior," "fragmented or severed into body parts,"
and "servility," are used throughout the Indianapolis ordinance,
166. E.g., American Booksellers Ass'n v. Hudnut, 598 F. Supp. 1316, 1335-36 (S.D.
Ind. 1984).
167. Beauharnais v. Illinois, 343 U.S. 250, 286 (1952) (Douglas, J., dissenting).
168. MacKinnon, supra note 4; Dworkin, supra note 99.
169. Hudnut, 598 F. Supp. at 1337-39. Some feminists believe the indeterminate In-
dianapolis ordinance language posed a second danger: vague terms could be used by the
(male-dominated) society and government against women, especially lesbians. Wall-
sgrove, supra note 122, at 12.
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but are neither self-defining nor defined. 170 One way around this
problem is to define broad but necessary terms within the ordi-
nance itself. Another is to use terms that are already well under-
stood in obscenity law. Either strategy is an appropriate way to
give prospective pornographers fair notice that their product will
run afoul of the law. The model ordinance uses both techniques.
D. Provide for Prospective Rulings
Perhaps the most important objection to the Indianapolis or-
dinance is that it imposed prior restraints. 17' Prior restraints,
are not impermissible per se, but before imposing a prior re-
straint, the state must give the affected party a full and fair op-
portunity to be heard in a speedy judicial determination.17 The
Indianapolis ordinance contained no such provision.1 7 3 On the
other hand, requiring the state to wait until after publication of
the material to prosecute is unacceptable because the primary
purpose of an antipornography ordinance is to avoid the harm
pornography causes, not to lock up or fine the pornographers af-
ter they have caused the damage.17 4 Moreover, the nature of por-
nographic material distribution is such that preventing publica-
tion is far easier and more effective than subsequent attempts to
halt sales and distribution. 7 5
The best solution is to allow a potentially affected party to
seek a prospective ruling as to whether the ordinance will pro-
scribe the material he or she wishes to publish. 76 Although pro-
spective rulings are generally rare in the United States, they are
frequently used to accommodate free speech concerns. 7 7 The
170. Hudnut, 598 F. Supp. at 1337-39.
171. Id. at 1340-41. For a discussion on the application of prior restraints in obscen-
ity cases, see Edelstein & Mott, supra note 59, at 546-66.
172. The Supreme Court noted the factors necessary for a prior restraint in Freed-
man v. Maryland, 380 U.S. 51, 59 (1965): action to enjoin publication must be taken
rapidly; the pretrial restraint must be "the shortest fixed period compatible with sound
judicial resolution;" the final determination must be made by a judicial officer, not an
administrative officer; and judgment must be promptly rendered.
173. Hudnut, 598 F. Supp. at 1341.
174. REPORT, supra note 2, at 287-89.
175. Id.; see Kaminer, supra note 125, at'755.
176. Other observers have suggested declaratory judgments as a mechanism to avoid
the conundrum. See, e.g., Note, Community Standards, supra note 34, at 1858; see also
Pollitt v. Connick, 596 F. Supp. 261, 267-68 (E.D. La. 1984).
177. See, e.g., Paris Adult Theatre I v. Slaton, 413 U.S. 49, 55 & n.4 (1973); McKin-
ney v. Alabama, 424 U.S. 669, 679 (1975)(Brennan, J., concurring); Kingsley Books, Inc.
v. Brown, 354 U.S. 436, 442-44 (1957) (upholding New York statute allowing limited
prior restraints in seizing obscene materials prior to trial); Sunshine Book Co. v. Sum-
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chief safeguards are to ensure a full and fair hearing, and to hold
the hearing expediently so that permitted speech is not unduly
hindered."'8
E. Avoid Politically-Charged Terms
The proposed model ordinance attacks both the traditional
evils associated with obscenity and the harms to women ad-
dressed by the Minneapolis and Indianapolis ordinances. The
model ordinance improves on the Minneapolis and Indianapolis
ordinances by carefully avoiding the use of politically charged
terms.
The reasons for this omission are twofold. First, political179
terms such as "subordination" and "inferiority" are vague. They
caused the courts to declare the Indianapolis ordinance void.
Employing accepted, well-defined legal terms may facilitate ju-
dicial acceptance of such ordinances. Second, the use of political
terms and the definition of the issue as a civil rights struggleL8 0
is self-defeating. An antipornography ordinance that defines
pornography as a political issue places itself squarely in the po-
litical speech arena; laws restricting political speech must meet
the strictest of standards. a1 8 Because the proposed ordinance at-
tacks almost all the materials the Indianapolis ordinance pro-
scribed, the Indianapolis wording has no particular advantage
other than to make a political statement.
The effect of the latter point should not be minimized. The
Indianapolis ordinance had a salubrious effect by defining the
issue as a political one: it served to redefine the terms of the
women's rights debate. Ten years ago, the affront to public
morals was the only evil associated with pornography. Then re-
search began to show pornography as a safety issue. Today, be-
merfield, 249 F.2d 114, 118-119 (D.C. Cir. 1957) rev'd, 355 U.S. 372 (1958); Pollitt v.
Connick, 596 F. Supp. at 267; cf. A Quantity of Copies of Books v. Kansas, 378 U.S. 205,
210-11 (1964); Entertainment Concepts, Inc. v. Maciejewski, 631 F.2d 497, 504 n.6 (7th
Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 450 U.S. 919 (1981).
178. See Freedman v. Maryland, 380 U.S. 51, 58-59 (1965); Zenith Int'l Film Corp. v.
City of Chicago, 291 F.2d 785, 788-91 (7th Cir. 1961).
179. As used by the feminist drafters of the Indianapolis and Minneapolis ordi-
nances, the terms are political because they are concerned with the disempowering of
women. For a discussion of the political significance of pornography and the terms of the
Indianapolis ordinance, see MacKinnon, supra note 4; Dworkin, supra note 99.
180. See supra note 9.
181. See Comment, Feminism, Pornography, and Law, supra note 97, at 528-31;
Brandenburg v. Ohio, 395 U.S. 444, 447-48 (1969).
[VOL. 23:1
Pornography Ordinances
cause of the Minneapolis and Indianapolis ordinances, pornogra-
phy is regarded as a political issue as well.182 But although the
issue is political, talking about rights is not enough. Legislative
action is necessary. Women are sustaining real harm because of
pornography; it is vitally important to put rhetoric aside and
pass an effective antipornography ordinance that the courts will
uphold as constitutional. The model ordinance does, in the end,
accomplish a political goal to the extent that it eliminates por-
nography that oppresses women; but its immediate goal is to
gain acceptance by using accepted legal reasoning, precedent,
and terms. As Brown v. Board of Education graphically demon-
strated, law can accomplish social and political goals; but in or-
der to accomplish social change, the law must first be on the
books.
Model Ordinance
I. Offensive Depictions
In all state obscenity prosecutions, the jury shall be instructed
that depictions of the following forms of conduct are patently
offensive under state law:
1) Rape, wherein the person being raped is portrayed as en-
joying, inviting, or deserving the assault;
2) persons bound, chained, or otherwise forcibly restrained in a
position and/or setting that makes such restraint sexual;
3) persons beaten, bruised, cut, mutilated, dismembered, other-
wise physically hurt, or murdered in a context intended to ap-
peal to the prurient interest of the viewer or reader;
4) persons urinated, defecated, or masturbated on;
5) persons penetrated (in any body orifice) by objects or animals
in a manner intended to appeal to the prurient interest of the
viewer or reader;
6) persons portrayed as enjoying pain or humiliation in a sexual
context or where the pain or humiliation is intended to appeal to
the prurient interest of the viewer or reader;
7) persons portrayed as enjoying, inviting, or deserving sexual
harassment or other sexual misconduct punishable by statute or
under the common law, where such portrayal is intended to ap-
peal to the prurient interest of the viewer or reader.
The same provisions shall apply when women, men, children,
and/or animals are the subject of the material.
182. See MacKinnon, supra note 4, at 18-20, 65; Wallsgrove, supra note 122, at 13.
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II. Terms and Conditions
1) "Prurient interest" shall be used as defined by the United
States Supreme Court. It shall be for the jury to decide whether
the creator, publisher, exhibitor, or distributor of the material at
issue intended the material to appeal to the prurient interests of
the audience. The court may find intent to appeal to prurient
interest upon examination of the material, without more. Once
the state has made out a prima facie case of intent to appeal to
prurient interest, the defendant may disprove such intent with a
contrary showing by a preponderance of the evidence. The jury
shall also consider whether the material, taken as a whole, ap-
peals to the prurient interest of the general public or the target
audience. It shall not be a defense that the material's prurient
appeal or circulation is broader than originally intended.
2) It shall be a defense to this act that the work at issue, taken
as a whole, has serious literary, artistic, political, or scientific
value.
III. Civil Rights of Action
1) Any author, producer, camera operator, publisher, distributor,
exhibitor, vendor, or other person involved in the manufacturing
or distribution of material covered by section I of this ordinance
may be sued for damages under this section. Regardless of any
claim that the material published has serious literary, artistic,
political, or scientific value, where the material proximately and
foreseeably causes physical harm to an identified person, that
person or his/her estate shall have a cause of action under the
law irrespective of any free expression claim. It shall be for the
jury to decide whether it was foreseeable that the particular
harm complained of would result from the portrayal.
2) Any woman injured by a portrayal of women in her profession
or job as primarily sexual objects, where such portrayal impairs
her ability to perform her work, or forseeably causes others to
impair her ability to perform her work, shall have a right to seek
damages under this statute.
3) Any person who has material that is prohibited under this
ordinance forced upon him/her in his/her workplace, place of ed-
ucation, or public place may seek damages under this statute.
Only the perpetrator of such force or the affiliated institution
may be held liable. "Force" shall be defined as the uninvited
presentation of pornography in such a way that the person can-
not reasonably avoid or ignore it. It shall be a defense to this
section that the pornographic materials were used for legitimate
educational purposes where alternative materials would not have
served the same purpose.
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4) Any woman who has been coerced, intimidated, or fraudu-
lently induced into posing or performing for material prohibited
by this statute, may seek damages and/or injunctive relief under
this statute. Proof of one or more of the following shall not,
without more, constitute a defense to this section or negate a
finding of coercion:
i) that the person is or has been a prostitute;
ii) that the person has attained the age of majority;
iii) that the person has been photographed or otherwise de-
picted in pornography in the past;
iv) that the person is related by blood or marriage to any per-
son affiliated in any way with the production, distribution, exhi-
bition, or sales of pornographic material.
IV. Prospective Rulings
1) Any author, publisher, photographer, distributor, exhibitor, or
seller of film, videotape, photographic, or literary material may
petition the court for a prospective ruling as to whether a partic-
ular work will be prohibited under this ordinance. A finding that
the material is prohibited may be appealed immediately, and, if
so appealed, shall be heard as soon as practicable by the appeals
court. Such ruling shall be considered a finding of fact by the
court in any subsequent litigation under this ordinance; except
that a finding that material is forbidden under this act may be
overturned by an appeals court hearing any appeal of a convic-
tion under this statute.
2) If, in a full and fair hearing for a prospective ruling under this
ordinance, with fair notice given to all interested parties, the
court finds a particular work to be prohibited under this ordi-
nance, and the material is published, exhibited, or sold in spite
of such finding, and in subsequent litigation over the material
the party charged under this act is not successful in having the
material declared not prohibited under this act, such party shall
be required to pay court costs and the attorney fees of the op-
posing party.
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